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Good	Law,	Good	Economics	
Tech	Central	Station,	November	6,	2002	
by	David	R.	Henderson	
	
	
It's	hard	to	believe	that	the	Microsoft	case	is	Judge	Colleen	Kollar-Kotelly's	
first	excursion	into	antitrust.	Her	decision	reads	as	if	written	by	someone	with	
a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	complex	series	of	precedents	that	constitute	
modern	antitrust	law.	In	antitrust	cases,	knowledge	of	the	law	must	also	be	
supplemented	with	an	understanding	of	economics.	Here,	too,	the	Judge	
shows	a	grasp	of	key	principles,	especially	the	crucial	importance	of	
incentives	in	encouraging	innovation.		
	
Consider	first	the	law.	In	the	last	30	years,	legal	scholars	have	adopted	the	
economist's	view	that,	whatever	the	original	motives	of	those	who	pushed	for	
the	Sherman	Act	of	1890,	there	is	only	one	justification	for	antitrust	law	today:	
to	protect	consumers	by	making	sure	markets	are	competitive.	The	law	should	
not	be	used	to	favor	some	competitors	over	others,	or	to	assure	that	
competition	is	"fair"	in	the	sense	that	no	one	is	driven	out	of	business.		
	
Judge	Kollar-Kotelly's	reasoning	track	this	consensus	perfectly.	At	page	46	of	
her	decision,	for	example,	she	chides	the	plaintiffs:		
	
The	Court	takes	careful	note	of	those	remedial	proposals	that	advance	the	
interests	of	particular	competitors	and	takes	pains	to	ensure	that	the	remedy	
in	this	case	is	not	a	vehicle	by	which	such	competitors	can	advance	their	own	
interests.	
	
One	major	supporter	of	the	nine	dissenting	states	actions	against	Microsoft	
was	Sun	Microsystems,	which	wanted	to	require	Microsoft	to	distribute	Sun's	
version	of	Java	-	software	that	serves	as	a	platform	for	small	software	
applications.	In	other	words,	Sun	wanted	to	coerce	Microsoft	to	use	its	vast	
reach	to	promote	Sun's	product.	But	the	Judge	saw	through	it.	"What	Plaintiffs,	
and	quite	clearly	Sun	Microsystems,	are	proposing	is	nothing	more	than	
'market	engineering',"	she	wrote.	(p.	316)	To	Sun	executive	Richard	Green's	
concern	that	without	such	coercion,	computer	makers	would	have	little	
incentive	to	distribute	Sun's	own	"Java	Virtual	Machine,"	Judge	Kollar-Kotelly	
responded:		
	
The	Court	finds	this	complaint	to	be	meritless,	as	a	lack	of	incentive	to	
distribute	a	particular	product	reflects	a	problem	of	a	competitor,	not	a	
problem	with	competition.	(p.	315)	
	
The	Judge	also	noted	that	requiring	such	special	treatment	for	Sun	
contradicted	the	legal/economic	understanding	of	even	the	plaintiffs'	own	
expert	economic	witness.	She	cited	University	of	California	(Berkeley)	
economics	professor	Carl	Shapiro,	who,	in	his	testimony	for	the	plaintiffs	
stated,	"to	the	extent	possible,	the	remedy	should	be	'technology	neutral,'	
leaving	it	to	market	forces	to	identify	the	most	promising	threats	to	
Microsoft's	monopoly."	Summing	up,	she	wrote:		
	
The	Court	can	conceive	of	no	provision	less	"technologically	neutral"	than	[the	
above	part]	of	the	Plaintiffs'	remedy.	Rather,	[this	part]	appears	to	be	a	bold	
manipulation	of	the	market	which	provides	a	particular	technology,	indeed	a	
particular	format	of	this	technology-the	Sun-compliant	format-with	an	
artificial	advantage	over	other	non-Microsoft	technologies	which	may	now	or	
in	the	future	compete	with	Java.	(p.	317)	
	
Throughout	her	decision,	Judge	Kollar-Kotelly	showed	a	keen	awareness	that	
incentives	are	the	life-blood	of	a	productive,	innovative	economy.	Amazingly,	
the	plaintiffs	had	proposed	that	Microsoft	be	forced	to	disclose	proprietary	
information	that	would	allow	Microsoft's	competitors	to	clone	Windows.	The	
judge	flatly	rejected	the	initiative,	pointing	out	that	such	a	remedy	"runs	
contrary	to	the	theory	of	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights."	(p.	164)	
Further,		
	
Such	a	scheme	inherently	decreases	both	Microsoft's	incentive	to	innovate	as	
well	as	the	incentive	for	other	software	developers	to	innovate,	since	they	can	
simply	create	clones	of	Microsoft's	technology.	(p.	164)	
	
The	plaintiffs	would	also	have	required	Microsoft	to	maintain	full	support	for	
predecessors	to	its	most	recent	version	of	its	Windows	-	a	regulation	that,	as	
far	as	I	know,	has	no	precedent	in	the	United	States.	Not	only	would	such	a	
requirement	run	afoul	of	the	Appeals	Court's	opinion,	the	judge	opined,	but	
would	retard	development	and	confuse	consumers.	"The	slowing	of	
innovation,"	she	wrote,	"cannot	be	squared	with	the	objectives	of	antitrust	
law."	(p.	182)		
	
Nor	did	the	judge	miss	the	fact	that	the	plaintiffs'	only	expert	economic	
witness,	the	above-mentioned	Carl	Shapiro,	presented	no	independent	case	
for	the	plaintiffs'	drastic	remedies:		
	
Dr.	Shapiro	was	unable	to	identify	any	source	other	than	the	district	and	
appellate	court	opinions	in	this	case	upon	which	he	relied	to	examine	the	
effects	of	Microsoft's	anticompetitive	conduct	upon	the	applications	barrier	to	
entry.	.	.	.	In	this	regard,	Dr.	Shapiro	admitted	that	his	citation	to	Judge	
Jackson's	Findings	of	Fact	in	order	to	illustrate	the	impact	of	Microsoft'	
anticompetitive	conduct	upon	Navigator	and	Java	included	conduct	which	was	
found	not	to	violate	the	antitrust	laws.	.	.	.	Dr.	Shapiro	also	conceded	that	he	
did	not	make	any	attempt	to	separate	the	effect	of	the	illegal	conduct	from	the	
effect	of	the	conduct	fund	not	to	be	illegal.	(italics	in	original)	p.	115	
	
It's	true	that	the	Judge	also	rejected	the	testimony	of	University	of	Chicago	
economist	Kevin	Murphy,	one	of	Microsoft's	experts.	But	here,	her	reasoning	
was	far	different.	She	agreed	that	Murphy	did	present	new	evidence	on	the	
effects	of	Microsoft's	anticompetitive	conduct.	But,	she	noted	that	Murphy's	
evidence	conflicted	with	the	Appeals	Court	finding	that	Microsoft's	behavior	
had	harmed	competition.	Because	Judge	Kollar-Kotelly	was	obliged	to	take	the	
Appeals	Court's	findings	as	given,	she	could	not	accept	Murphy's	evidence	
even	had	she	found	it	as	compelling	as	I	did.		
	
Equally	striking,	Judge	Kollar-Kotelly	seems	to	have	a	feel	for	the	role	of	
technological	innovation	in	the	software	industry	-	a	feel	that	led	her	to	limit	
the	term	of	the	Court's	decree	to	five	years.	The	usual	length	of	such	decrees	is	
ten	years.	But	because	technology	is	moving	so	fast	in	software,	imposing	a	
remedy	"is	not	unlike	trying	to	shoe	a	galloping	horse."	(P.	178)		
	
Were	the	Court	to	impose	a	ten-year	term,	it	is	likely	that,	by	the	latter	half	of	
the	term,	the	market	will	have	long	since	sent	the	horse	to	pasture	in	favor	of	
more	advanced	technology.	Thus,	although	the	remedy	crafted	by	the	Court	is	
undoubtedly	forward-looking,	it	is	beyond	the	capacity	of	this	Court,	counsel,	
or	any	witness,	to	craft	a	remedy	in	2002,	for	antitrust	violations	which	
commenced	in	the	mid-1990s,	which	will	be	appropriately	tailored	to	the	
needs	of	a	rapidly	changing	industry	in	2012.	(P.	178)	
	
I	would,	of	course,	have	preferred	the	Microsoft	case	not	come	to	this.	After	
all,	for	the	next	five	years,	Microsoft	will	operate	under	onerous	regulations	
that	none	of	its	competitors	will	face.	Still,	had	the	dissenting	states	had	their	
way,	Microsoft's	principle	assets	would	have	been	expropriated		
	
A	judge	who	has	just	finished	handling	the	first,	and,	most	likely,	the	biggest	
antitrust	case	of	her	life,	has	done	a	great	service,	not	just	for	Microsoft,	but	
also	for	consumers.	More	important,	she	has	ably	defended	the	property	
rights	and	rule	of	law	that	protect	the	freedom	and	wealth	of	us	all.		
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